Objective. To identify all financial incentives that had been proposed, described, or used regardless of their initial objective and, when possible, to assess the results of these incentives on costs, process or outcomes of care.
Financial incentives are used in addition to other measures The possibility of using financial incentives, and the type of incentives used is directly dependent on the structure such as education, or organizational changes which aim at: (i) reducing utilization of health care resources; (ii) transforming and financing mechanisms of a health care systemthe socioeconomic and cultural context. Thus, both the clinical practice; and (iii) improving quality of care or reach a general health target [1, 2] . One difficulty in interpreting the experiments made with financial incentives in one country and the results obtained may not be reproduced straighteffects of a financial incentive is that all three objectives can be set, resulting in a variety of incentives and end-points.
forwardly in another country unless major structure reforms are undertaken [3] . It must also be kept in mind that We attempted to identify all financial incentives that had been proposed, described, or used regardless of their initial other non-financial measures, such as continuing education sessions or mandatory practice guidelines, affect physicians objective and, when possible, to assess the results of these incentives on costs, process or outcomes of care. The behaviour and possibly revenue. The causal relationship between financial and non-financial incentives is therefore analysis of financial incentives cannot be separated from the general context of the health care financing system. not straightforward.
Results
for managed care in the USA, and the number of non-financial incentives used within its environment. These incentives differ From a total of 130 articles retrieved, 89 met the criteria described above and were for kept for final analysis. Of from one plan to another and include: utilization review, peer pressure and educational activities [33] . these, eight reported results from randomized controlled trials. Other articles that did not describe actual studies but With regard to negative incentives, physicians who had previously been penalized tended comply more readily [34] , addressed methodological issues were kept for the discussion.
We report in sequence: (i) the exhaustive list of financial physicians who were informed on the threshold (volume of prescriptions for example) that trigger sanctions and on the incentives described in the literature, regardless of their results, the quality of their assessments, and whether or not actual financial risk to themselves were more likely to respond [3, 35, 36] . they were legal; (ii) the confounding factors; (iii) the risks that were described as a possible outcome of financial incentives, Out-of-pocket payment for patients (insurance coverage) affected the way physicians reacted to patients' demand for whether or not they were actually proven; (iv) the effects of financial incentives on the use of health care services, process health care. One objective of financial incentives directed towards patients had been to make it easier for physicians and outcome; (v) methodological issues. to achieve cost containment goals, and these incentives thus constitute a confounding factor.
Typology of financial incentives
Characteristics of financial incentives are described in Table 1 . Risks related to the use of financial incentives Concerning capitated payment and fund-holding, a difference must be made between capitation by physician and capitation M. Rodwin described the risk to the quality of care of establishing a direct link between the revenue of physicians by patient. Capitation by physician means that the officebased physician is given a historically-based sum of money and their ability to deny care [19] . When financial incentives • reduced range of services offered to patients, par-Effects of financial incentives on use of health care services, process and outcome of care ticularly in the case of prevention and psychological support;
The effects of financial incentives have usually been described from observational studies: simple data collection, time series, • underuse or improper use of emergency services resulting in delayed treatment and related medical com-opinion polls, prospective studies, intervention studies without a control group, models, literature reviews, but seldom plications; from randomized controlled trials [35,44-50] ( or prospective same-physician (GP) studies. Negative results surgery and to private clinics. The differences observed between fund-holders and non-fund-holders in the UK were reported are the absence of effect on the workload of GPs (no transfer to either specialists or hospitals) [51] . Positive attributed in part to the confounding factors described above [53] . Of interest is the same-physician study conducted among results include a 0-24% reduction in prescription costs (the null hypothesis is not excluded) [5] and in total number of those who did not participate in the fund-holding experiments.
When given a financial incentive close to that of their funddrugs per prescription [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] . Shifting from fee-for-service to fund-holding reduced the number of referrals for elective holding colleagues, non-fund-holders reduced prescriptions by 1-3% and shifted to generic drugs [15] . The major hospitalizations, whereas provision of services increased when the fee was increased [47] . A randomized prospective 9-limitations of these studies were the poor level of evidence and the short duration of follow-up. month study of physicians compared the impact of salary versus fee-for-service reimbursement on physicians' beFee for service haviour [50] . Fee-for-service physicians scheduled more visits per patient than did salaried physicians (0.86 more) and saw A same-physician study looked at the effect of increasing the their patients more often (0.49 visit more). Fee-for service fee for night visits. The result was a 33% increase in the physicians also provided better continuity of care by attending number of visits by GPs and a 19% decrease in visits made a larger percentage of all visits made by their patients (8.3% by deputies [20] . Fee-for-service with a tariff freeze was tried more) and by encouraging fewer emergency visits per enrolled in a number of countries, and a same-physician study assessed (0.1 fewer than salaried physicians). the results in Quebec [57] . The potential savings from the A randomized physician trial studied insurance-related tariff freeze were outweighed by an average 6% increase in differences in physicians' practice [45] . Physicians were asthe quantity of services produced. Implementing a ceiling signed randomly to eight scenarios (of discretionary, nonon the annual revenue of physicians resulted in a modest discretionary, preventive and diagnostic/therapeutic services) redistribution of patients from more to lesser active physin which patients were either insured or uninsured. For icians, and a reduction of total medical revenues. The coninsured patients, physicians recommended the same services clusions of the Quebec experiment were that physicians had to 72% of patients versus 67% for uninsured patients the capacity to influence the demand from their patients both (P < 0.001), they recommended both discretionary (50% verin terms of quantity and in terms of type of services provided sus 42%, P < 0.001) and non-discretionary services (93% [11, 57] . The burden of the ceiling fell mostly on high revenue versus 91%, P < 0.05) more often for insured than for nonphysicians.
insured patients. A same-disease study on gynecological patients concluded
The general effect of prospective payment on hospital care that fee-for-service seemed to encourage, whereas capitation is a reduction in utilization of services (both length of stay seemed to discourage, gynecologists from performing elective and admissions); the magnitude of the effect appeared to be procedures. Shifting from fee-for-service to capitated contract related to the disease category. From the Veteran's Adreimbursement seemed to affect physician decision making ministration interrupted time-series data, it appeared that for only the most elective of procedures, whereas similar the greatest reductions concern psychiatric disorders [62] . practice patterns were maintained for severe conditions [58] .
Managed care has been found to reduce the cost per admission by on average 20%, with greater reductions found in those Salary hospitals that promote sharing of resource use with physicians Salary and fee-for-service were compared in same-physician and dissemination of guidelines on the processes of care [63] . studies. Salaried physicians referred their patients less freIn the 'Health Stop' same-physician experiment, physicians' quently and had a lower level of activities: fee-for-service revenues increased with the number of procedures and doctors chose home visits more often than salaried doctors, prescriptions. The implementation of a bonus system, but this was statistically significant for 'scheduled' visits only whereby doctors who prescribed more X-rays and tests had [59] , and saw patients during working hours. When forced higher revenues showed that physicians could increase by 12 to go on salary, physicians traded revenue for leisure [57, 59] . to 23% the total volume of their prescriptions [64] . A randomized trial was performed to determine whether reManaged care (USA) vealing the threshold that triggers financial sanctions affects physicians' practice patterns for six different procedures [35] .
Use of health care resources
When the threshold was known, physicians reduced their The positive effects of managed care reported from sameprescriptions. There was no evidence of an incomepatient, same-physician studies were a reduction in patients maximizing response to revelation of the screen parameters costs, mostly due to reduction in length of stay. Converging or any suggestion that providers scheduled procedures to results indicated that an overall 25% reduction in costs could avoid review when they know the parameters. be expected, with as much as 80% in hospital length of stay and ambulatory costs for certain case-types [60, 61] . SameProcess of care patient studies reviewed by Miller and Luft [10] found that
The impact on financial incentives on diagnostic strategies, enrolment in a managed care plan compared with a noand the likelihood of missing a diagnosis have been explored network fee-for-service insurance resulted in lower hospital in two same-physician studies. Both found that physicians admission rates and length of stay. The magnitude of the tended to reduce costs by limiting the number of diagnostic effect varied from 70 to 0%, two of the 15 studies reviewed procedures and providing higher quality clinical decisioneven reported a 10% increase in hospitalizations. The exmaking [65, 66] . A randomized patient trial conducted in New planation for these results may be that the managed care plans York [46] assessed the effect of utilization review (second presented wide differences among themselves. A randomized opinion) on patterns of health care for 20 elective procedures. study of fee-for-service versus capitation for the children's Requiring second opinion reduced the number of procedures Medicaid programme found similar results: capitation significantly decreased the number of physicians' visits and performed in all cases (P=0.02).
Three same-disease studies assessed the effects of financial outcomes of 1574 HMO and fee-for-service patients over a 4-year period. While there was no difference in physical and incentives on physicians' compliance with practice guidelines. One study concerned patients with congestive heart failure mental health when total population in each group were compared, subgroup analyses showed differences. Poor or and compared fee-for-service and Medicare enrolees in a variety of managed care plans [67] with regards to both elderly patients treated in fee-for-service practice had better outcomes than those treated in HMOs [74] . financial and process of care outcomes. The authors found no differences in the hospital management of patients, and
The one randomized (Medicaid elderly) trial reported data on health and functional status outcomes and quality of care an improved compliance with practice guidelines during the follow-up. Similar results were found in the study on influenza in prepaid versus fee-for-service HMO patients. The authors did not find a significant difference in the primary outcomes immunization, a randomized study that compared the rate of immunization in a population of elderly patients. Physicians measures: number of deaths, proportion of patients in fair or poor health, physical functioning, activities of daily living, were randomized to either no financial incentive or a performance-based incentive. The rate of immunization was visual acuity, blood pressure or diabetic control. The access to or quality of care and patient satisfaction did not differ found to be significantly higher (7% higher) in the population treated by doctors who were given the incentive ($.80 per between prepaid and fee-for-service physicians groups [44] .
There was a trend toward better general health rating scores shot or $1.60 per shot if an immunization rate of 70% or 85%, respectively, was attained) [48] . A third study compared (P=00.6) and well-being scores (P=00.7) in the prepaid group compared with the fee-for-service group. physician behaviour before and after enrolment in a managed care plan: the end-points were rates of immunization, screening for cholesterol levels and charting adequacy. The plan Methodological issues did not only provide financial incentives, but also a variety Unlike other studies, those on financial incentives are hardly of non-financial incentives. Compliance rate with guidelines amenable to structured systematic review or meta-analysis of improved significantly across practices by an average of their results. This is due to the small number of randomized 25-100% [68] . In a same-disease survey on dental care, trials, and to the lack of comparability of both interventions authors found that the actual amount and quality of treatment and study populations (physicians or patients). We identified proposed did not differ between fee-for-service and managed a number of items that should be present in an assessment care patients [69] . Such favourable effects of financial inof financial incentives [75]: centives were not confirmed by the randomized physician trial by Hillman et al. on breast, colorectal and cervical cancer
• data origin (population of physicians and patients); screening. Feedback on performance and financial bonuses
• percentage of patients enrolled in a given plan; failed to increase the compliance rate with guidelines in a Medicaid health management organization (HMO) [49] .
• expected effect of the incentive: on resource use, Conflicting results were found by a review of same-disease practice patterns or patients outcome; studies on cardiovascular care in HMO versus fee-for-service
• type of feed-back to physician and doctors; patients. It appears that compliance with guidelines for the management of hypertension or hypercholesterolemia was
• type of study (times series, opinion polls, trial), sameeither greater or identical in HMO than fee-for-service. When patients, same-physician; acute events were considered, HMO patients tended to have
• type of incentive given to physician; better processes of care than fee-for-service patients, and when final outcomes were considered, no conclusion could
• existence of a stop-loss protection and its threshold; be reached on which payment system gave better results [70] .
• general environment: peer review, educational activities, Another study, however, indicated that physicians treating guidelines, types of payments for doctors other than HMO and non-HMO patients reduce the care given to HMO that studied; patients while increasing it for non-HMO patients [71]. This did not concern acute patients such as the cardiac patients
• patient disclosure, regulations, legal environment, in the Seidman study [70] or patients treated in intensive care stakeholder; units. In a same-disease study, Angus et al. found no difference
• purchaser-provider relationships. in practice patterns for HMO and non-HMO patients admitted top the intensive care unit. Incidentally, the authors also found a modest beneficial effect of HMO enrolment on mortality [72] . A controlled before and after study assessed Discussion hypertension screening in primary care [73] . The programme (physician education and incentives) was found to be effective Of the many studies published on the impact of financial in improving hypertension screening practices (odd ratio: incentives on physicians and patients behaviour, few met the 3.67).
basic criteria proposed by the Cochrane group on professional practice. Furthermore, the results presented were often preOutcomes of care liminary over a short follow-up period. Few studies used the same methodology to assess the impact of the same incentive, The Medical Outcomes (same-disease) Study compared the which limited the external validity of their conclusions. When combine both improving health in the population and maintaining their revenues [87] . Some physicians try to maximize looking at the effects of incentives within managed care their revenue, other use a more complex indicator of revenue, environment and without (European countries and Quebec), quality of care and patient satisfaction [88] . the general results appeared to be similar: salary and capi-
The availability of a number of financial tools (i.e. payment tation/fund-holding reduced the use of services, whereas feemethods) should induce reflections on the possible use of for-service increased it. Such results were also found by different tools in conjunction. Different types of physician Gosden et al. in their review of the effects of salary payment payment could be used depending on the programme confor doctors [76] . From the results of the studies currently sidered. In areas when more services need be provided, feeavailable, it is not obvious that the effects of an incentive for-service could be appropriate, whereas capitation or fundwere magnified by the managed care environment, in part holding may be used to reduce spending for an over-serviced because physicians adapted their prescriptions to the level of population. Financial incentives in the hands of 'good' manreimbursement to the patient and cross-subsidized patients agers and doctors may result in better quality of care, providing with poor medical coverage [45] . The very small number of that the evidence exists to show which care and how much studies from health care systems that do not operate in a care is enough [89] . managed care environment renders comparisons difficult, which is a shame because it would be interesting to know how much managed care is necessary to contain costs and
